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THINKING THINGS, NOT WORDS: IRVIN RUTTER'S
PRAGMATIC JURISPRUDENCE OF TEACHING
Gordon A. Christenson *
Those of us in legal education and in the profession of law are in
debt to the Law Review for publishing in this issue the last work of
the late Professor Irvin Rutter, Law, Language, and Thinking Like a
Lawyer.' In his study of Karl Llewellyn and American Legal Real-
ism, William Twining wrote:
At the University of Cincinnati Professor Irvin C. Rutter in
conjunction with a series of particular courses developed the
best theoretical analysis of lawyers' operations that has yet ap-
peared in print.2
On the occasion of Irvin Rutter's retirement in 1980, I briefly
summarized these earlier contributions, locating them within the
legal realist tradition, and we awaited the publication of his last
work, then still in draft not quite satisfactory to Professor Rutter.3
In this essay, I situate his final work on teaching law in the pragma-
tist tradition with special emphasis on Charles Sanders Peirce. I also
try to relate the work to scholarly and critical inquiries about law
that were just emerging as Rutter completed his 1977 draft.
A TEACHING PRAGMATIC
Rutter's earlier work, a jurisprudence of lawyers' operations and
applied skills, led Karl Llewellyn to organize a plenary session at the
1961 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
focused on Rutter's work.4 Rutter completed both curricular and
scholarly projects by constructing the Applied Skills Program at the
University of Cincinnati College of Law and publishing his theses. 5
Finally, in the mid-eighties, Rutter authorized me to help him find a
publisher (after I had passed on from Yale Law School Myres Mc-
* University Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. Irvin C. Rutter, Law, Language, and Thinking Like a Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303
(1993).
2. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 355-56 (1973).
3. Gordon Christenson, Irvin C. Rutter, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 337 (1980). There, I
pointed out that Rutter studied at Columbia Law School with the great legal realists who
were completely rethinking legal education during the 1920s and early 1930s. These
included Karl Llewellyn, William 0. Douglas, Herman Oliphant and Walter Wheeler
Cook, among others. Id. at 337.
4. Irvin Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301 (1961).
5. Irvin Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First Year Curriculum, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 9
(1968); Irvin Rutter, Law Teaching and the Curriculum, 1963 A.A.L.S. REP. 81; Irvin Rutter,
The Trial Judge and the Judicial Process, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245 (1963).
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CINCINNATI I4 W REVIEW
Dougal's plea to publish it). Grounded in legal realism, this work
was not then of interest to the law reviews or else they wanted it
updated to include more recent scholarship in hermeneutics, critical
thinking, and post-realist jurisprudential developments from this
country and the post-structuralists or deconstructionists from the
Continent.6
As a fresh reading will reveal, Rutter had anticipated many
problems and contradictions. He had chosen explicitly to keep his
project simple, focused on fact-skepticism and language, and instru-
mentally in the "how" of teaching lawyers to think specific things
and events, not abstract words. That choice now seems a virtue.
The work left off in 1977. While it may seem too embedded in real-
ist instrumentalism 7 instead of theorizing about justice and value
choices or uncovering deceptions and illusory choices, it does offer
a strength and purpose far broader than a pure "how to" manual.
Its core method has an intellectual "praxis" or practical rigor that
anticipated, perhaps better than the realists did, many questions
now before us in current scholarship.8 In the "how" of showing stu-
dents and lawyers to think words and events, not abstractions, Rut-
ter's project provides a sorely needed communicative link between
the academy and the profession. It sees print just as the McCrate
Commission's final report on bridging this gap, especially in skills
training and values, has once again asked what it is that law schools
and the bar ought to teach and learn.9
6. That Rutter knew of these questions is clear in examining his text carefully. See,
e.g., Rutter, supra note 1, at 1318, 1323 (semantics and values); id. at 1324-25, 1331
(deconstruction or deception); id. at 1331-33 (refining "reification" of language and the
argument against essentialism); id. at 1341-42 (language and multiculturalism or race);
id. at 1349-50 (skepticism about neutral principles); id. at 1345-46 (factual character of
rules of law); id. at 1354 ("the community" needs visualization); id. at 1327 (nonverbal
"traces"); id. at 1325, 1350-51 (indeterminacy of language); id. at 1323-25 (events and
things; social facts as value descriptions).
7. See Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L.
REV. 689, 690-91 (1968) (secularization of law and the functional or instrumental
approach to problem-solving introduced by American legal realists undercut the ideal
and respect for the rule of law).
8. Comments to Rutter on the preliminary circulation in 1977 included those of
Myres S. McDougal of the Yale Law School: "The most profound study of law and
semantics I have seen. It makes most of the points the American legal realists made, but
much more clearly and persuasively than they ever made them." Then Chief Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, Charles D. Breitel, also wrote Rutter: "Magnificent,
and as important as was Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush." Verified from private papers of
Irvin C. Rutter.
9. Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, Report of
the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, ABA, Sec. of
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, Robert MacCrate, Esq., Chairperson (July
1992) (identifying "fundamental skills and values to be acquired").
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1993] PRAGMATIC JURISPRUDENCE OF TEACHING 1283
Law, Language, and Thinking Like a Lawyer begins with the famous
Holmes adage from an address to lawyers on law and science.
Holmes said that we must use law language to "think things not
words."' 0 In his work's introduction, Rutter links "reality" of par-
ticulars in the external world (or things and events) to thinking, us-
ing language for both facts and thinking. When Rutter then
narrows his focus to how "thinking like a lawyer" can be taught and
achieved as a "life-long development of learning by experience," he
plunges us deceptively, perhaps ironically, into semantics, semiotics,
pragmatism, linguistics, psychology, psycholinguistics, and anthro-
pology but without grand theorizing.'1 Actually, Charles Sanders
Peirce had used similar words in his essay, How to Make Our Ideas
Clear, generally thought to contain the earliest published kernel of
Peirce's pragmatic theory of logical meaning for scientific con-
10. Rutter opened his work with the entire enigmatic quote: "We must think things
not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which
they stand, if we are to keep to the real and true." Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899). Judge Posner commented, in
comparing Holmes to Nietzsche, that this adage illustrated Holmes's "antimentalism";
"[b]ut a highly referential theory of language is compatible with a disdain for abstraction
(as in Bentham); what is not a thing, is nothing." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 241 n.30 (1990). Will Durant, in discussing the ancient paradoxes of
Zeno (e.g., any body such as an arrow in order to move to point A, a tree, must reach B,
the middle of its course toward A, but to arrive at B it must first reach C, the middle of its
course toward B, and so on to infinity, so that an arrow logically never reaches its
destination), said that these discussions may continue-as they have from Plato to
Bertrand Russell-"so long as words are mistaken for things." The assumption that
"infinity" is a thing instead of merely a word indicating the inability of the mind to
conceive an absolute end invalidates the puzzle. 2 WILL DuRArr, THE STORY OF
CIVILIZATION 351 (1939); see also ERNEST GELLNER, WORDS AND THINGS (rev. ed. 1959).
11. Rutter greatly admired WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW,
LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS (1972), a path-breaking course-book for law schools. It spawned
much work in philosophical underpinnings of law, fact, and language. But Rutter
thought that most law students, in contrast to professors, also needed a theory of
practical skills. Richard Posner, who finds the new pragmatism bracing, thinks the most
important thing law schools do for students is to impart a "feel for the outer bounds of
permissible legal argumentation at the time when the education is being imparted."
POSNER, supra note 10, at 100. He stated:
What "thinking like a lawyer" means is not the use of special analytic
powers but an awareness of approximately how plastic law is at the
frontiers-neither infinitely plastic, as a Thrasymachus might think, nor
rigid and predetermined, as many laypersons think-and of the
permissible "moves" in arguing for, or against, a change in the law. It is
neither method nor doctrine, but a repertoire of acceptable arguments
and a feel for the degree and character of doctrinal stability, or, more
generally, for the contours of a professional culture-a professional
culture lovable to some, hateful to others.
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CINCINNA TI L4 W REVIEW
cepts. 12 At the time it differed from the pragmatic theory of truth or
belief associated with William James:
One singular deception ... [imaginary distinctions drawn be-
tween beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression] is
to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of
thought for a character of the object we are thinking. Instead
of perceiving that the obscurity is purely subjective, we fancy
that we contemplate a quality of the object which is essentially
mysterious; and if our conception be afterward presented to us
in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, owing to
the absence of the feeling of unintelligibility.... Another such
deception is to mistake a mere difference in the grammatical
construction of two words for a distinction between the ideas
they express. In this pedantic age, when the general mob of
writers attend so much more to words than to things, this error is
common enough.' 3
12. W.V. Quine's work is but one of many that might be viewed as contemporary
successors to the pragmatism of Peirce and James. A.J. AVER, PHILOSOPHY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 242-52 (1982). See, for a recent summation, W.V. QUINE, PuRsurr
or TRUTH (1990). A major recent work in legal philosophy that grounds much of its
view-point in Peirce's pragmatism is POSNER, supra note 10 (in particular the last chapter,
"A Pragmatic Manifesto," at 454-69). See SIDNEY HOOK, PRAGMATISM AND THE TRAGIC
SENSE OF LIFE ix, 3-4 (1974)(technically first a theory of meaning, then a theory of
truth). Hook expands:
[Until people become gods]-which will never be-they will live with the
sense of the tragic in their hearts as they go in quest for wisdom.
Pragmatism, as I interpret it, is the theory and practice of enlarging
human freedom in a precarious and tragic world by the arts of intelligent
social control.
Id. at 25.
13. Charles S. Peirce, Illustrations of the Logic of Science, Second Paper-How to Make Our
Ideas Clear, 12 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY, Jan. 1978, at 286-302 (emphasis added).
Compare Peirce's thinking to the discussion of Zeno's paradox of the arrow for a
concrete image. See supra note 10. Holmes, James, and Peirce all were members of the
"Metaphysics Club" in Boston beginning about 1870 and lasting for a few years, where
they attacked the old metaphysics of absolutism and the a priori method and favored
scientific Darwinism and experimentation. Apparently, Peirce presented a paper to the
Club in 1870 mentioning "pragmatism" from the Greek "practical" or "praxis." James
borrowed the term, but later resurrected Peirce in his 1898 lecture, "Philosophical
Conceptions and Practical Results," reminding the philosophical world of Peirce's 1878
article as the foundation of pragmatism. Peirce still later used "pragmaticism," probably
to try to salvage some credit, but also because he had credited someone else for the term
"pragmatism." Just how much Holmes was influenced by either Peirce orJames is open
to conjecture and remains unclear. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41
STAN. L. REV. 787, app. (1989). Mark Howe doubted any influence, as did G. Edward
White. MARK D. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-
1882, 75 (1963); G. Edward White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 LAw & HIST. REV.
440 (1986). Morton White connected Holmes with the Metaphysical Club. MORTON
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 62 (1947). Other scholars agree with Morton
White. F.R. KELLOGG, FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES (1984); Max H. Fisch,
Justice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law and Pragmatism, 39 J. PHIL. 85 (1942); Jerome
1284 [Vol. 61
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1993] PRAGMA TIC JURISPRUDENCE OF TEACHING
While Rutter cited to Peirce,' 4 he made no attempt to connect the
adage he called Holmes's "isolated ornament dropped to float in no
readily discernible context"' 5 to either Peirce's orJames's pragma-
tism. Rutter did keep a connection to Holmes's legal realism, no
doubt related. He simply resisted-explicitly-venturing into philo-
sophical underpinnings of "truth" or "reality" or "meaning" and
accepted the common sense intuition of external reality of things
and events that language could reflect and impress with meaning.' 6
Nor did Rutter see any point in belaboring subjective or ideological
world-views of value or culture concealed in language, thought, and
legal process or the contradictions within them. Beyond doubt, he
knew they were there. Were he, however, to have pursued theoreti-
cal relationships between perception, fact, value, and thought, he
would have strayed from the effectiveness of his teaching
methodology.
Rutter was sophisticated; better, we should say he was learned. In
Part II of the work, for example, he described the theoretical
sources he drew upon for understanding the relationship between
language and thinking. That various languages (such as those in
other disciplines and in diverse cultures) have selected different in-
terpretations from the same nonverbal world, he saw clearly. Rutter
then had to accept the conclusion that the meaning of language can-
not be meaning-free or neutral. In Part III, he applied this under-
standing of the structure of language to show us examples of why
rules as words, as in the plain meaning rule, cannot be free-floating
in meaning disconnected from a contextual reality of the nonverbal
world.' 7 The irony we can now fully appreciate lies in his aside that
Holmes's adage itself free-floated.
Frank, A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations of the Founders of Legal Pragmatism, 9
RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 444 (1954); see SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE
LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 426-27 n.4 (1989); POSNER, supra note 10, at 16, 239-
44.
14. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1313 n.18 (mentioning only that the linguistic insights of
Peirce were expanded by William James in Pragmatism (1907), leaving open Peirce's
originality not appreciated by James).
15. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1303.
16. Compare Rutter's use of common-sensism to that of Peirce who drew part of his
pragmatism (his "critical common-sensism") from the Scottish Enlightenment
philosophers, Thomas Reid in particular. See JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE:
A LIFE 52 (1993).
17. As made clear in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA Xvii
(Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989). A completely different use of context
in interpreting statutory language showed up in a recent Supreme Court opinion. In
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 61 U.S.L.W. 4060 (Jan. 12, 1993), Justice Souter,
had to determine whether a use of the word "person" for purposes of authorizing in
forma pauperis proceeding in federal courts indicated a context different from its broad
1285
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VISUALIZATION OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND EVENTS
According to Rutter, in agreement with Holmes, all theorizing-
even the grandest jurisprudential speculations-originated from the
experience of life.' 8 For Rutter, in contrast to Holmes, this experi-
ence consisted of the events of daily existence.' 9 Immediately or
remotely the theorizing must be about these events. When abstract
generalizations lose touch with the daily "trivia" of life, they become
meaningless. However, so long as the nexus with things and events
is maintained, the theorizing-even theorizing about sensate per-
ceptions of reality through language-illumines thought with in-
sight and affects the "trivia," transforming it at its most concrete.20
For law students, Rutter's classroom reminder to "visualize" was
"convenient shorthand for reaching nonverbal behavior." 2' This
imaginative activity of the mind's-eye aimed at reducing "abstrac-
tions to lower levels, approaching nonverbal behavior as closely as
our purpose may require-close enough to restore the nexus with
the originating experience without which all language is meaning-
less." 22 This "picturing" drew straight from American pragmatism
of the Peirce variety, but applied specifically to law teaching, not to
the world at large. Peirce called this provisional hypothetical imagi-
definition in the Dictionary Act (that included corporations and associations, etc., as well
as individuals). If it did not, then an entire association of prison inmates was eligible to
file. Justice Souter held for the Court that the particular statutory context did indicate a
different meaning, that only natural persons were eligible. He wrote: " 'Context' here
means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of
other related congressional Acts" and not the legislative history or broader nonverbal
context. Id. at 4062. In dissent, Justice Thomas wrote, "Congress has created a rule of
statutory construction (an association is a 'person') and an exception to that rule (an
association is not a 'person' if the 'context indicates otherwise'), but the Court has
permitted the exception to devour the rule." Id. at 4068 (Thomas,J., dissenting). Both
Rutter and Llewellyn would have thought that for the precise reason Thomas gave, the
contextual meaning could not be deterinined without reference to a nonverbal context
that might, of course, be expressed in policy or legislative history, but not entirely from
words in relation to words only.
18. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1938).
19. Holmes referred to the "life of the law" or history of what judges decided-the
"felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men"-not their logical syllogisms, as equivalent to experience. Id. Rutter
referred to the daily trivia of life as the things or events law takes account of through
language of rules or facts, including "type-facts" akin to social facts.
20. See generally Rutter, supra note 1. There is a bit of Emerson here, that insight
transcends and transforms the moment. That Emerson had some influence on
American pragmatism-through Peirce, James, Holmes, and Dewey-seems to have
been accepted. See BRENT, supra note 16, at 28, 45-46, 200, 209, 255; POSNER, supra note
10, at 463.
21. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1333.
22. Id.
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nation, "abduction," setting it apart from inductive and deductive
logic. 25
Rutter illustrated his method. For example, in a simple problem
he gave students to draft a bulk sales agreement, Rutter would con-
sciously omit the date from the facts that would specify how the
creditors were to be ascertained. He would then ask that students
"'visualize factually' the nonverbal process of rounding up creditors
as persons." 24 Often came a stunned recognition that it cannot be
done "in some timeless cloud." They could not escape doing it at
some time and place, whatever intellectual exercise existed in select-
ing a correct "reasonable" date.2 5 When lawyers go through the
physical conduct of closing the bulk sales agreement, avoiding a
specific real time to round-up the creditors is physically inescapable.
"Yet in the verbal world of language, when we 'talk about' (actually
write) it, it becomes possible to escape the inescapable.' '26
He illustrated the "visualization" method in the political arena, as
well, addressing the question whether President Ford had made a
deal to pardon President Nixon as part of a resignation package.
The political setting favored using such abstractions as, "There was
no agreement between us." These abstractions easily concealed
(thus avoiding the recognition of) any nonverbal political under-
standings. Rutter examined the congressional hearings process by
asking questions to show how to create pictures of the actual setting
for any alleged "deal" by imagining the circumstances before asking
for the precise details from those involved. The best lawyers know
this skill by habit.
Applied to more complex events closer to our own time, such as
doing something about gross violations of human rights, Rutter's
method shows us how easy it is to create verbal escape from a prob-
lem. Verbal expression might describe the outrages or try to rectify
them by general arguments made to some authority about whether
the acts are violations of human rights norms, but these semantic
and syntactic manipulations can be but avenues of escape. Abstract
words might become solutions without "picturing" and specifying
precisely what intervention is to be done and by whom it will be
23. For a recent connection, see Jeanne Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Peirce's
Logic of Imagination and Feminist Methodologies, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1991).
24. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1306.
25. Id. "Yet by 'talking about it' (the 'verbal world') it becomes possible and in fact
frequent to escape what would be inescapable in the 'nonverbal world' of
behavior. . . .[T]his 'gap' arises from the 'illusion of meaning' inherent in language,
chiefly attributable to its 'abstractness,' with consequent shortcomings in observation,
analysis and 'thinking.' " Id.
26. Id. at 1306-07.
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done to correct the abuses and solve the problem without setting in
motion unintended or worse consequences. Consider how the
term, "ethnic cleansing," developed rapidly both shaping and being
shaped by the nonverbal pictures and events daily broadcast from
the Balkans. To the participants and to journalists and politicians
the words mean many different things. To international lawyers,
they have little legal meaning without precise factual reports of spe-
cific events, specific operational options to intervene under Security
Council or other authority; the identification through language of
the norms of international law that characterize the events and spe-
cifically how counter-force is to be applied without doing more
harm than good. If a war crimes tribunal is to be more than verbal
escape, particular perpetrators must be captured and charged with
violating specific humanitarian law. Operations of arrest and trial
must be constituted by particular officials, persons, or governments.
And if the verbal escape is the only response possible, then we must
accept the primitive vengeance of tribal feuds or worse and try to
contain those outrages lest the carnage and brutality escape and
spill over and affect the general stability of the central Euroasian
land mass.
Even when general rules must be used with a high degree of ab-
stractness, as in statutes or international norms, the visualization re-
quired is of a more comprehensive process involving policies and
decisionmaking aimed at reaching postulated goals with operational
precision. Legislative and quasi-legislative fact processes work
through specifying goals and then operationally reaching them
through precise verbal and procedural know-how.2 7 Rutter did not
tackle these policy-oriented approaches. In the same general tradi-
tion, however, Lasswell and McDougal spent much of their lives de-
veloping a comprehensive and policy-oriented or "configurative"
jurisprudence that insisted on clarifying goals and specifying opera-
tions to implement community expectations measured as social facts
over time.28
Rutter might have drawn abundantly from the now-burgeoning
field of law and literature to deepen his students' "legal imagina-
tion" as they visualize nonverbal, human experiences and use them
27. Cf. Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Education in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943) (adding a
constructive dimension to legal realism reshaping it into "conscious, efficient, and
systematic training for policy-making").
28. See 1 & 2 HAROLD D. LA5SWELL & MYERS S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A
FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1991).
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in words and practice. 29 This critical and creative literature pleased
Rutter, and it was too late for him to take it into account. He was
not about to stray into this scholarly community. I wish he had. It
would have been a fruitful encounter, to try to expand the legal im-
agination as new voices from ancient and new communities ap-
pear.30 He might have asked whether words themselves can
constitute violence as Robert Cover thought.3 ' Richard Weisberg
would have challenged him with the poetics of jurisprudence
(poethics) returning, as Peirce did too, to Plato or Nietzsche for an
aesthetic grounding of ethics and law. 3 2 It was also late for Rutter
to watch Richard Posner grow in his encounters with feminist critics
such as Robin West in understanding the unity she claims feminist
jurisprudence has with literature.33 And Rutter would have been
glad to see a new colleague, Thomas Eisele, join Rutter's own
faculty to offer a course on legal imagination and to write on teach-
ing lawyering skills.3 4
THINKING AND LEARNING
Grounded in a thorough knowledge of structural and semantic
linguistics, Professor Rutter's interest in language was "opera-
tional" in the sense that he insisted on its practical and functional
utility.3 5 His connection of language with the learning process de-
rived from the proposition that it was the unique human capacity for
language that made the generalizations of theory possible but insep-
arable from what we call "thinking." By utilizing our knowledge of
the structure and function of language, Rutter sought to enhance
the effectiveness of the "thinking" counterpart. He called this ap-
proach training in thinking and, for a lawyer, "thinking like a law-
29. JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW (1985); JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER, & COMMUNITY (1984).
30. Of the many new voices, consider the powerful narratives of TONI MORRISON,
PLAYING IN THE DARK (1992).
31. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1986).
32. See RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW & LITERATURE
(1992); RICHARD WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER
IN MODERN FICTION (1984); see also RICHARD WEISBERG, On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for
Constitutional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE (Sanford Levinson & Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988).
33. See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988);
see also Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature
Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129 (1988).
34. See Thomas D. Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of
Implications and Possibilities, 54 TENN. L. REV. 345 (1987).
35. Cf POSNER, supra note 10, at 463-66.
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yer." Lawyering is merely a special kind of thinking, using rules or
legal categories as a special language.
"Does this kind of thinking enmesh us in dominant male legal lan-
guage?" feminist pragmatists might ask. Why not "thinking like a
woman" or "thinking like a woman lawyer"? 36 Or, why not "think-
ing like an African American (or Hispanic, Asiatic, or Catholic) or
homosexual lawyer"? These questions would not have been alien to
Rutter, since he assumed language meaning shifts with circum-
stances, culture, or psychology. His "picturing" process easily en-
compassed different visualizations of the nonverbal things and
events words are used to depict. But he would have asked students
from these various groups, "So what? Can you visualize what the
difference means and makes? If you can, then shape your words
close to that nonverbal picture of the specific practical difference
you are seeing."
Rules are only words, not "reifications," Rutter assumed we all
knew. He thus resisted the temptation to belabor or even to use
vaguely what the realists showed long ago.37 He did not need to
deconstruct rules or texts or show how indeterminate they are. Nor
did he need to demonstrate how inescapably determinate their for-
mulation could be through tight rules of decision to control later
decisions. Broadly formulated and clear "rules" of doctrine might
reintroduce formalism to keep judges from too much subjective dis-
cretion38 and bind them more closely through reformulated stare
decisis. 39 Rutter found such considerations word play, perhaps the-
36. See Susan M. Okin, Thinking like a Woman, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 145 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER &
MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1991).
37. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1331. He called "reification" a disagreeable-sounding
word, used with as much deception as it seeks to avoid. He used the term to refer to the
treatment of language as having "full" meaning,
an ideal wholly at variance with its abstract character. More accurately, it
ignores the omission from language of the fullness of nonverbal
experience. Using "meaning" to refer to the adequacy and accuracy of
language to reproduce nonverbal experience, it is the assumption that
language has more meaning than it does in fact. This is not a conscious
assumption. The result is that the character of language permits and
even encourages its use without simultaneous relating back and taking
into account its factual foundations. I have called this "deceptive" or
"illusory" meaning because its occurrence is largely unconscious.
Id. at 1331-32.
38. See Paul Gewirtz, Introduction, in LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at xvii-xxiii.
39. Rutter's use of stare decisis would seem to follow the radical empiricism of
Herman Oliphant, one of the great realists who assembled at Columbia Law School in
the 1920s where Rutter received his law degree in 1931. Oliphant left Columbia in 1929
for the Law Institute at Johns Hopkins University where for a few years the realists
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ology, 40 avoiding the connection with untidy human events and cha-
otic phenomena that later decisionmakers using his method would
obviously make. Rutter's method, approaching even a tight formu-
lation of rules with visualization, might escape the formal lock of
previous words.
Rutter both anticipated and avoided what Paul Gewirtz has called
"the enduring crisis that realism produced in legal thought." In re-
viewing Llewellyn's recently published 1928-29 Leipzig lectures to a
German audience on the case law system, Gewirtz has written:
Indeed, Llewellyn's focus on contradictions, dualities, and lee-
ways in the law clearly anticipates some central elements of the
modem critical legal studies movement, which has focused in-
sistently on the contradictions and indeterminancies of law. In
this and other respects it is fair to say that critical legal studies
is, as one of its founders recently wrote, "a direct descendant
of American Legal Realism." 4 1
Rutter agreed with Llewellyn's view that "[a]ll words (that is, lin-
guistic symbols) and all rules composed of words continuously
change meaning as new conditions emerge."' 42 He did not, how-
ever, seek to describe, as Llewellyn did and as a policy scientist
might, the trends of judicial decision when each judge makes the
"direction and degree of semantic change in a legal rule (or a verbal
symbol used by the rule) keep up with the corresponding change in
the real-life situation." 43 That intellectual task was for the social or
embarked in advanced graduate education in law in relation to society through empirical
and theoretical investigation. He joined Roosevelt's New Deal administration until his
death in 1939. See generally Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71
(1928) (Oliphant's call to action in his presidential address at the December, 1927
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools) [hereinafter Return to Stare Decisis];
Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-judgments, 10 TEXAs L. REv. 127 (1932) (a
reply to those who disagreed with the importance of applying scientific methods to the
study of law and social phenomena). For an opposite approach, reintroducing
formalism through a form of common law positivism, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). I think Rutter, obviously influenced by
Oliphant, would be closer to the contemporary views of Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court 1991 Term, Foreword: TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV 22,
57, 70, 112-16 (1992) (connecting social practices and culture over time with Holmes's
pragmatism through experience). Rutter's modesty, interestingly, appeals to the search
for common ground in immediate, concrete experience, reminding one of Ockham's
razor, the late scholastic resistance to needing to find God in every decision.
40. Oliphant advocated reversing the retreat from stare decisis by "making law more
a science of realities and less a theology of doctrines." Return to Stare Decisis, supra note
39, at 81.
41. See Gewirtz, supra note 38, at xvii (quoting Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An
Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986)).
42. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 83.
43. Id.
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policy scientist.44 Rutter narrowed his focus. He wanted to show
only how the teacher or lawyer actually brings thinking and insight
into the particular thing expressed through legal language. He
wanted to teach the lawyer or judge to engage in a process, which
Llewellyn was merely describing, at its most basic point of transfor-
mation. This learning skill is similar to how a child learns the world
of particular things and language through experience and play. 45 It
is unique and powerful.46
COMMUNITIES OF INQUIRY AND THE TEACHING PRAGMATIC
Rutter's simplicity in fact-power has great relevance in teaching
within various communities of inquiry. All communities use lan-
guage and experience to reveal or conceal power structures and
contradictions in social values imbedded in the word symbols of law.
For example, various communities sustain or defend against a cri-
tique of the liberal state and the rule of law. Not only scholars in
critical legal studies, 47 but also those in critical race theories, femi-
nist jurisprudence, 48 and law and society might find Rutter's work,
though dated, quaintly useful. Rutter himself was dubious about
references to "the community." These words too, he thought, were
abstractions. Perhaps they reflected a bias "in favor of a particular
segment of the community, suggesting the need for more precise
factual visualization of common references to the community." 49 In
44. One of the subjects Rutter taught was international law. He did not write in this
field, but admired post-realist work such as that of Falk or Lasswell, McDougal and
Reisman. In the work of signals and communications of social facts, he shared a similar
view of language reflected in the work of W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A
Process of Communication, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture, in PROCEEDINGS, 75TH
CONVOCATION, AM. Soc'y, INT'L L., Apr. 23-25, 1981, at 101, 105. ("[L]awmaking or the
prescribing of policy as authoritative for a community is a process of communication...
[involving] the mediation of subjectivities from a communicator to an audience and, in
successful cases, a reception and incorporation by the intended audience, resulting in a
set of appropriate expectations ....").
45. Rutter mentioned Wittgenstein in a footnote reference, but does not discuss his
language games. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1313 n.18. Posner believes Wittgenstein is a
pragmatist in his view of the sociality of knowledge. POSNER, supra note 10, at 149-51,
464.
46. Consider the experience reported by former Dean Sam Wilson, Irvin C. Rutter, 61
U. CIN. L. REV. 1277 (1993), who was one of Rutter's prize students.
47. These scholars include both the constructive communitarians and the nihilists of
the radical left. But see Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar. Does Critical Legal Studies
Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 304 (1987).
48. Rutter's teaching method could be useful to some feminists now working on
Peirce's pragmatism as a way to construct a feminist jurisprudence by rethinking
scientific knowledge by hypothesis formation. For an example of this, see Schroeder,
supra note 24, at 109.
49. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1356.
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refusing the grand theorizing about universals, ideals, or essences, 50
which has disillusioned so many contemporary theorists who claim
(generally in sophisticated attacks on the liberal Enlightenment tra-
dition of reason) 5' to have discarded the rule of law, Rutter framed
his pedagogy from the pragmatic perspective. For many years, law
school teaching methods have introduced the realist difficulty Llew-
ellyn tried to work through and Gewirtz described. Rutter's simple
method strengthens the contemporary project to imagine and create
nonverbal experience through language without universals, abstrac-
tions, or essences. He did not deny that these abstractions pervade
our communities of inquiry.
Some commentators use the word, "postmodernism," to describe
post-Enlightenment projects that try to see through any legitimating
"metanarrative" such as a declaration of universal rights that keeps
the state out of the domain of private rights or that holds the state to
an idealized set of positive human rights.52 What difference does it
make whether to use the word "postmodern"? 53 Picture in the
mind's eye nonverbal things or events to question Enlightenment
rationality. By using Rutter's pragmatic "visualization" of incoher-
ent social facts, one can plainly "see" a legitimating myth system (as
in equal privileges or immunities) that contradicts an operational
code (such as special privileges in practice).54
How might Rutter's simple practicality fare with those students
and lawyers who may sympathize with various critical race, critical
50. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1989).
51. See JEAN-FRANcOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (seeking displacement of
philosophy of the Enlightenment with a picture of knowledge as a move within a game,
the pragmatics of interaction, as participants struggle for control of the game); James
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 685 (1985).
52. See generally LYOTARD, supra note 51.
53. For a "postmodernist" survey of feminism and law that is sympathetic to
pragmatism, see Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
254, 272-79 (1992). Patterson argues that postmodernism is no threat to feminism.
But, if "[fleminism aspires to a metanarrative about gender or patriarchy" and if (with
Lyotard) we agree that "the era of the totalizing and legitimating metanarrative is at an
end," then doesn't it follow that postmodernism is a form of male discourse, reifying
what happens? Id. at 257.
54. For a description of the empirical difference between the social fact of a myth
system and the social fact of an incompatible operational code, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN
& AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 23-53
(1987) (Chapter 2, "Myths, Multiplicity and Elites: Appearance and Reality in the Law,"
draws upon anthropological and jurisprudential literature to describe these social
artifacts). But cf. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW (1991).
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feminist, or ultra-conservative legal theorists but who do not wish to
master the philosophical or theoretical discipline required to enter a
community of inquiry?55 To engage fully from inside intellectual
communities that are not yet part of the language of a larger and
dominant legal community requires an extraordinary commitment.
I believe there is a linkage not readily seen in Rutter's method.
Revisiting the theories of Charles Sanders Peirce reveals Rutter's
connection to the roots of pragmatism. The relationship of lan-
guage, things, or events and thinking has been developed by mod-
ern "pragmatists. " 56 These roots have fed Noam Chomsky,57 Hilary
Putnam, 58 John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen (both were Peirce's
students at Johns Hopkins University), 59 Richard Rorty,60 Donald
Davidson, W.V. Quine,6 1 among others, 62 not to mention the work
of William James, probably Holmes, and Judge Richard Posner to-
day. 63 Rutter's respect for Whorf's linguistics also has its pragmatic
55. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 436 n.17 questioning whether "communities of
inquiry" (a Peirce ethical construct) means the same thing as Stanley Fish's "interpretive
communities" which he may have got from Josiah Royce (Christian interpretive
communities) who studied with Peirce at Johns Hopkins. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). Later in
life Peirce came to believe that like Plato he had escaped the imprisonment of these
communities (which Fish denies is possible) through aesthetics-admiration of one's
hypothetical God-creation. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739 (1982) (stating we can escape our interpretive community); see also Stanley Fish,
Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) (stating we are already part of the one we can't
escape).
56. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 257-311 (1979)
("Epistemology and Philosophy of Language"); id. at 296-97 (Peirce and the fallacy of
reductionism); see Richard Rorty, Pragmatism, Categories, and Language, 49 PHIL. REV. 197,
197-223 (1961) (comparing Peirce's and Wittgenstein's anti-Cartesian use of the infinite
regress argument that both used against metaphysical foundations of truth).
57. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1326 n.53 (citing NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND
(1968)).
58. HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 12-14, 32, 36 (1988) (stating
changes in scientific reality "out there" over time affects the meaning of a word).
59. BRENT, supra note 16, at 127, 157; see also JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
PROBLEMS 183-84 (1927) (connection between aesthetics and intellectual inquiry in the
public discourse). Sidney Hook was a student of Dewey and decried the misreading of
Peirce and Dewey as unprincipled expediency. See HOOK, supra note 12.
60. See RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS 1972-1980)(1982).
Posner discounted Rorty's pragmatism as Romantic with "a weak sense of fact."
POSNER, supra note 10, at 384-87 & n.37.
61. WILLARD V. QUINE, On What There Is, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: NINE
LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 1 (2d ed. 1980); WILLARD V. QUINE, THEORIES AND
THINGS (1981).
62. See Edwin W. Patterson, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE COMMON MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN DEWEY TO CELEBRATE HIS EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY 172 (1940); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331 (1988).
63. POSNER, supra note 10, at 462-69.
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aspects.64 Peirce's pragmatism may have influenced newer scholars
such as Joan Williams, 65 Margaret Radin,66 and Katharine Bartlett.67
Rutter's method should be useful to law teachers as they teach law
students who are interested but do not have the commitment
of scholars engaged in an appropriate community of scholarly
inquiry. 68
Rutter, modest to a fault, used much of what was spawned by
Peirce through the legal realists. Peirce developed a triadic relation-
ship between a sign, the thing or event signified, and the imagina-
tive visualization by the thinking observer using the sign.69 Rutter's
teaching method reflected this triadic architectonic of signifier, sig-
nified and imagined meaning or thinking for the community of law-
yers he taught. In its early formulation, which Peirce later revised, a
thinking person's normative structure is furnished through the rele-
vant community that practices the inquiry. This idea is quite com-
patible with Rutter's assumption that language meaning varies with
culture. We must keep clearly in mind that Rutter was participating
in a community of practice as a teaching lawyer not as a scholar en-
gaged with others in developing theories about law. Explicitly, he
was developing a theory of teaching. The pragmatic tradition
grounded his teaching method, not his general theory about law.70
Rutter recognized the inadequacy of this approach, but wanted
merely to develop a tool, an instrument for effective learning. He
64. Rutter relied on the "Whorfian Hypothesis" that language is a "shaper of ideas"
including categories and types isolated from the "world of phenomena we do not find
there because they stare every observer in the face. . . because we are parties to an
agreement . . . that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the
patterns of our language." Rutter, supra note 1, at 1329-30 (citing BENJAMIN L. WHORF,
LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY 212 (1956)).
65. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989); see Joan C.
Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence & The Rise of the New Langdells, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987) (rejecting the "picturing" of an underlying structural reality
of reason or knowledge and accepting the later Wittgenstein's use of language from
inside the borders of a practice-this would be close to Peirce's early pragmatism before
he left communities of inquiry and attempted to create his own aesthetic ground for
ethics).
66. Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).
67. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
68. Peirce developed a self-proclaimed all-encompassing theory he thought equalled
the logic of Aristotle and Leibnitz. He suffered mightily for this hubris throughout his
life. He remained outside or left nearly every community of inquiry except perhaps in
his early life those science communities involving semiotics and the logic of science.
BRENT, supra note 16, at 325-47.
69. See id. at 330-35. The full range and powers of Peirce's pragmatism has been
made more accessible by this extraordinary biography and by the continuing Peirce
Edition project of Indiana University.
70. Cf Reisman, supra note 44.
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stayed with his point. He resisted wrapping up the universe. In
conversations with me, he said simply that moving beyond his teach-
ing pragmatic would take him too close to the abyss and to inquiries
about life and existence, too close to the deeply religious and ulti-
mate questions for him to put in his law.
PRAGMATISM, ETHICS, AND AESTHETICS
Toward the end of his own life, Peirce approached these funda-
mental questions concerning life and existence. In private Rutter
did too, although he never related these ultimates to his work.
Peirce reached his synthesis by connecting ethics normatively with
logic, but not as previously he had through a community of in-
quiry. 7' New normative experiences might enter a traditional lan-
guage not from within the borders of a practice, he concluded, but
from a self's aesthetic connection with the whole external world.
This relationship seems strikingly close to an understanding of
Plato's later forms of truth as being grounded in aesthetics. Peirce
classified ethics, logic, and science as normative ultimately through
aesthetics. That leap came from a human being's willed admiration
of the physical universe.
Ten years before James used his varieties of religious experience,
Peirce created quite dramatically a triad of relations drawing upon
poetic imagination inspired by Shakespeare. Peirce's article, "The
Architecture of Theories," elaborated his triad vividly: "First is the
conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Sec-
ond is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reac-
tion with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation,
whereby a first and second are brought into relation."'72
Peirce's biographer, Brent, described how "meaning" is
constructed:
For the pragmaticist, the meaning of a first and a second is
constituted as Thirdness. Meaning is, therefore, purposive be-
cause something will happen when a first meets a second.
Words to describe Thirdness are mediation, purpose, generality,
order, interpretation, representation, and hypothesis. While the abso-
71. He thought he escaped the communities of inquiry but as in a Greek tragedy
approached madness for his earlier hubris. If Stanley Fish is right, one can never escape
one's interpretive community, and Peirce suffered and atoned because he could not. See
FisH, supra note 55. Compare Hook's view of the tragic sense of life as "pragmatic." See
HooK, supra note 12.
72. BRENT, supra note 16, at 333. He also wrote poignant pieces about what he
would have taught a son he never had and letters to James and Judge Francis Russell of
Chicago (examining his life as a failure but with the persistence of a "wasp in a bottle").
Id. at 322-47.
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HeinOnline  -- 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1296 1992-1993
    
 
c ersati s it  ,  i  i l  t t  
ing prag atic ould ta e i  t  l s  t  t    t  i i i  
a t life  ist , t  l  t  t   
t  sti s f r i  t     
P IS , I ,  I  
ar  t   f i   li , i    
ental questions c cer i  lif   ist .  i t  r 
did t , alt   r r l t  t    
eirce reached is s t esis  ti  t i  ti l   
logic, t t s r i sl    t   it   
quiry.71 e  r ati e ri es i t    
 t    ,  
fro  a self's aest etic ti  it  t  l  l  
his relati s i  s s tri i l  l  t   i g  
Plato's later for s f tr t  s i  r  i  t ti . e 
classifie  t i s, l i ,  i   ti  l   
aesthetics. at l   fr    i '  ill   
  
en years before Ja es s  is ri ti s  r li i  i , 
eirce create  it  r ti ll   t i      
ti  i i ti  i i   re.  
rc itecture f ries," l ted   st  
c ce ti  f i   i ti  ndent   
 is t e c ce ti  f i  r l ti  t , t  tion  
ti  it , s t i g l . i  i  t  tion , 
r   first a  sec  are brought into relation. "72 
eirce's i ra er, r t, ri   ing" IS 
t t : 
For the prag aticist, t e ea i  f  fir t    i  
tit ted .  , i  
ca se s t i  ill       
r s t  s ri  ir ss  i ti , e, lity, 
order, i ter retation, r r s tation,  t i . il   
71. e thought he escaped the c ities f i ir  t  i     
approached adness for his earlier ris. If t ley is  i  ri t,   er e 
one's interpretive ity,  ir e ff r   ed    t.  
FIS , supra note 55. o pare ook's ie  f t  tr i  s se f lif   atic."  
OO ,  t  . 
. T, s r  te , t .  l  t  t  t t  
would have taught a son he never had and lellers to Ja es and Judge rancis ssell f 
hicago (exa ining his life as a fail re t it  t e r i t ce   sp   . 
I . t - . 
1993] PRAGMATIC JURISPRUDENCE OF TEACHING
lute present and immediate, unthought, unconscious experi-
ence describe Firstness, and existence and the compulsion of
external reality, of brute fact, of the blank resistance we find
everywhere in our experience-the Outward Clash-describe
Secondness, Thirdness is that which mediates between the two
and gives meaning, order, law, and generality. Thirdness is
the category which brings intelligibility into the Peircean uni-
verse by showing where it leads. Thirdness is pragmatism re-
formed in its real purposiveness by the expulsion of
nominalism. It is the idea that Mind moves toward concrete
reasonableness in the long run. This brief illustration shows
how Peirce's triadic architectonic ranges seamlessly from the
most minute to the most immense concepts. 73
But if ethical conduct is self-controlled conduct, as Rutter's lim-
ited use of thinking like a lawyer assumed,74 this
pragmatism, even reformed as pragmaticism, provides no way
to distinguish between the virtue of one consequence and an-
other, except in terms of ever more distant and indistinct con-
sequences, that is, in terms of habit or continuity .... If we
murder (an action which we currently call a moral evil) in such
a way that the idea of it were to become realized in the long
run in a general way in habit or law-it would become good
because it had joined the harmony of the way things have
come to be in the long run.75
Judge Posner shows the close affinity between Holmes and Nietz-
sche (and Peirce and Dewey as well) in the ultimates of power and
creativity. 76 Holmes's early fascination with force as the ultimate ba-
sis for law, led him away from the pragmatic tradition of Peirce and
Dewey. The later Holmes drew upon Nietzsche as Emerson did, for
the affirmation of superior creative powers as against the mediocrity
of the herd.
Rutter surely knew of this problem with legal realism. Every nu-
ance in Law, Language, and Thinking Like a Lawyer revealed his aware-
ness, but he resisted being drawn to seek an ultimate justification for
his instrumentalism. All problems were fact problems, Rutter
thought. Nonetheless, we are led to the question of value and ends
through language and thought as mediated through things and
events. Peirce's agony, in realizing that only through doing can con-
crete virtue be admired, drove him to his self-reflection in later
73. Id. at 334.
74. Posner, too, places great emphasis on self control. POSNER, supra note 10, at 450.
75. BRENT, supra note 16, at 342-43.
76. POSNER, supra note 10 at 239-44; see also John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986).
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years. He constructed the highest good in "the esthetic ideal, that
which we all love and adore, the altogether admirable, [which] has,
as ideal, necessarily a mode of being to be called living .... More-
over, the human mind and the human heart have a filiation to
God." 77 Peirce reached the normative through aesthetics. Peirce's
way of musing (he called it the Pure Play of Musement) was to re-
pose in every part of one's mind for its beauty, for the ideal life. In
time the depths of Peirce's soul was stirred by the "beauty of the
idea and its august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving
and adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring
above all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the
springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis."178 Thejusti-
fication for the moral life and for Peirce's final ordering of the nor-
mative sciences was aesthetics, followed by ethics and then logic. 7 9
Rutter, of course, chose not to embark upon that philosophical
journey, content to assemble some teaching tools for all those who
are trying to enter a community of lawyers through the language of
the law. But he inevitably did make choices, as all tools are cultural
artifacts and legal tools no less so. The lawyer's craft has ethical and
aesthetic reach, but in making his tools for the law teaching craft,
Rutter did not connect with what Peirce finally did when he made
his pragmatism normative through his aesthetic.
LANGUAGE, CULTURE, GENDER, AND RACE
Rutter pointed out that gender designations in languages have no
meaning apart from cultural practices. He noted that "despite the
historic conscious and tyrannical division between the sexes among
the Polynesians and Chinese, their languages do not distinguish
genders at all." 80 When Rutter later accepted the Whorfian Hy-
pothesis that language shapes experience, to order the chaos of the
world "out there," a "buzzing blooming confusion" as described by
William James, 8 1 the tyranny of language or of prior experience re-
77. BRENT, supra note 16, at 346 (quoting from Peirce's article published in 1908, "A
Neglected Argument for the Reality of God").
78. Id. Peirce had been rereading Plato's Timaeus, and his position is close to Plato's
view of the universe as a "Living Being," "an everlasting likeness [of the creator]
moving according to number-that to which we have given the name Time." Id. at 345.
79. Bertrand Russell in his early work rejected this pragmatic connection of the
physical world with ethics through aesthetics and thought that it derived from a false
conception of biological evolution inspired by Henri Bergson. BERTRAND RUSSELL, OUR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD, As A FIELD FOR SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN
PHILOSOPHY 24-28 (1914) (maintaining ethical neutrality for knowledge of the external
world).
80. Rutter, supra note 1, at 1322.
81. Id. at 1315, 1329.
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flected in the rules of law is evident. Rutter would have had great
sympathy for feminists and critical theorists in their attempts to
change the cultural meaning of the language of racist or sexual sub-
ordination. His method of pragmatic teaching, through picturing
the nonverbal subordination (many now propose imaginative narra-
tives or stories of subjugation), would force students to confront
what mere ideological verbal skirmishes could escape.
Recently, Rorty has related philosophical pragmatism to the femi-
nist thought of MacKinnon's non-essentialist version 82 in his 1991
Tanner lectures, "Feminism and Pragmatism," at the University of
Michigan. 83 Feminist pragmatism is not concerned with whether
some foundational unalienable natural right to equality and liberty
has been denied women (the very notion of equal rights for women
entails constituting a male community). It is concerned with using
language through experiences in communities of inquirers consti-
tuted outside the dominant male civic discourse.8 4 Could Rutter's
teaching tools themselves be trapped in male language discourse? I
have explained above how at least he minimized the abstract ideo-
logical argument by asking students to visualize events that legal
language constitutes and words subordinate. 85
Drucilla Cornell criticizes MacKinnon's realism for much the same
reason as one might now criticize Rutter, for allowing the discourse
to be characterized as male in its descriptive sense. A contradiction
ensues within MacKinnon's own analysis, according to Cornell,
about the all-pervasiveness of the reality of gender identity: "with-
out the affirmation of some kind of ideal, even if that ideal be MacK-
innon's own implicit conception of freedom, feminism loses its
critical edge because it can only reinforce the masculine viewpoint
as all of reality."8 6 Without a countervailing feminine "reality" or
"imaginary" there is no possibility of "seeing" or experiencing the
events of subordination except through the male viewpoint of ab-
stract rights talk.87 There is "need to speak the unspeakable, to give
82. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (1988) for an
explanation of the difference between cultural feminism (based upon a positive
difference from men through communal nurturing connections) and radical feminism (a
form of essentialism describing invasion and torment in a male patriarchical verbal and
nonverbal world as the essence of woman).
83. See also Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MIcH. Q. REV. 231 (1991).
84. See Radin, supra note 66, at 1699. For a survey of feminist methodologies that
attempt constructive-loosely "pragmatic"-approaches, see Bartlett, supra note 67, at
829.
85. See Radin, supra note 66, at 1710.
86. CORNELL, supra note 54, at 130.
87. Id.
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voice to the imaginary." 8 8  That Peirce saw how to give voice to the
imaginary, to speak the unspeakable, surely does not constitute all
new voices into male discourse. Does Drucilla Cornell criticize this
fallible experimentation (as Peirce would put it) as male language
even when it invites women to join in and permits its own revision?
I think she does. She asserts a feminist alliance with Derrida and
deconstruction, pointing beyond social reform to justice, allowing
women to affirm the feminine, differently, as "other than our mere
opposition to the masculine." 8 9 Cornell's language and thought im-
agery, though, seem very close to Peirce's-and in a sense to the
pragmatism that Rorty finds in MacKinnon's refusal to reach the es-
sence of Woman or of difference.
In 1914, near the end of a tragic life, Peirce wrote to his friend
Mary Pinchot thanking her for a Christmas basket of food. It was
the last letter he ever mailed. In it he said of women:
As for female suffrage, no doubt women are about as fit for
it as the men,-or say, no more unfit .... But I don't believe
that, in the mass, they desire it, or ought to desire it; and in
this country I think they have all the influence they need de-
sire. In the great mass your sex is so much better than ours,
and does what it undertakes in so superior a fashion, that the
only question to my mind is whether it will ever desire to cast
votes .... 
9 0
The same abstract language then and now to a pragmatist would
mean different things. Rutter would not find it necessary to engage
in the theoretical discussion to agree with the fact that language
shapes experience, but experience also redefines language-as in
the letter's sentiment of gratitude we do not have to find a pro-
nouncement on the ultimate question of whether Peirce patronized
women. By his remarkably flexible and radical visualization of non-
verbal events, Rutter asked for imagination of circumstances in the
mind's eye of the user of language to illumine the language only by
88. Id. at 110. Alasdair MacIntyre's criticism of Derrida for turning social pathology
into philosophy illustrates the male tradition-constituted inquiry:
This self-defined success becomes in different versions the freedom from
bad faith of the Sartrian individual who rejects determinate social roles,
the homelessness of Deleuze's nomadic thinker, and the presupposition
of Derrida's choice between remaining "within," although a stranger to,
the already constructed social and intellectual edifice, but only in order to
deconstruct it from within, or brutally placing oneself outside in a
condition of rupture and discontinuity.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSEJUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 368-69 (1988). Maclntyre
does not think much of Peirce's attempt to create a new tradition equal to Aristotle's. Id.
89. CORNELL, supra note 54, at 111.
90. Quoted in BRENT, supra note 16, at 318-19.
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the events that the language aims at constituting. Whether this
method is male conversation inviting to women, depends upon the
imaginary constitution of thought by language from the perspective
of women or anyone else from within their own experience of sub-
ordination (or domination). This "picturing" can be done through
Rutter's tools as well as by any other, maybe even better for law
students and lawyers not participating in the various communities of
theoretical inquiry, but who need some lawyer's tools stronger than
tradition.
Just try visualizing subordination of someone of a different gen-
der or race using another's language; getting inside the situation.
Peirce might applaud this exercise, but then we might imagine him
today launching a full-scale assault on democracy beyond that even
of MacKinnon's critique of the State.91 Rutter would require
greater discipline for a lawyer's visualization of Peirce's possibly
ironic statement about women's superiority today and their vote.
The same pragmatic could be used to visualize the subordination
through language from within an African American experience or
from within any language culture, so long as it reaches the nonver-
bal experience in its surroundings and creates its own response
(thus avoiding structural realism). 92
It would be a hopeful sign if coalitions of human beings as lawyers
might use language pragmatically, illumined by the aesthetic imagi-
91. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162-64
("[The] State is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male
power on the relation between law and society. .... especially vivid in constitutional
adjudication, thought legitimate to the degree it is neutral on the policy content of
legislation."). Rorty defends MacKinnon's extensively developed feminist theory in
terms similar to those Peirce used to reformulate pragmaticism during his last days: an
exercise of transformative imagination of what rational alternatives and circumstances
would fall within the language used by the signifier. Richard Rorty, Feminism and
Pragmatism, 13 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1, 14-15 (1992). Posner sees the
feminist jurisprudence differently, not necessarily as pragmatic. POSNER, supra note 10,
at 393-413.
92. A similar pragmatic understanding of language and race can be seen in the work
of Toni Morrison and others. See MORRISON, supra note 30, at 8 (a reluctance to
substitute one domination for another, while insisting that the presence of race be
acknowledged as an unspoken part of the formation of a new white cultural hegemony in
the New World and in literature); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE
L.J. 2007 (1991)(stating that one's own experience as a person of color legitimates claim
to distinct scholarly voice); Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-
American Presence in American Literature, 11 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 121
(1988). Cornell questioned whether anyone can escape "myth" of "blackness" or
"Woman signifies" or dethrone myth altogether without a neutral concept of the person
which only restates the gender and race divide. She agreed with Morrison that our
"only option is to work within the myth to reinterpret it." CORNELL, supra note 54, at
196.
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nation of those who see the world through different experiences.
They may then think about it in language that visualizes myth and
nonverbal events from the standpoint of communities outside the
dominant culture. This pragmatic pedagogy does not deny and may
even create broader communities with transformed language and
literature speaking across all ethnic, gender, and racial barriers.
CONCLUSION
In teaching law, when we choose not to fight about abstractions in
our language symbols, as Irvin Rutter's last work explains, theft we
do not have to wrap up the universe in every legal problem we solve
by language discourse. Nor do we need to accept that we are
trapped in the caves of our own communal language and myth, un-
able to transcend the shadows our own tribal connections cast on
the wall. Instead we might seek to use the language of the law
pragmatically, teaching "how to see" things and events or disputes
about facts, relating them through new language to the fabric of
continuous decision and the rules of decision in particular relation-
ships within larger communities. As a practical matter outsiders to
dominant communities of practice might gain without insiders nec-
essarily losing.
Irvin Rutter ended his work as he began it, conceding that he did
not show us, after all, how "to think things not words" as Holmes
admonished; but he showed us how to bridge a number of gaps in
the triadic relationships between the creative thinking person, the
world of things and events, and the language of law. He did this
through the teaching tools he left behind in the tradition of Ameri-
can legal pragmatism.
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